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THE END OF EMPIRE
By Fred D. Schneider
Within the space of a generation, the British Empire has
disintegrated in a way that appears extraordinary, even in
retrospect. "How marvellous it all is," Lord Rosebery exclaimed
at the end of the nineteenth century. If marvellous in its
growth, the Empire has been no less significant in the manner
of its passing.
The decline of great empires exerts a peculiar fascination
over the mind of the historian; indeed, more has been written
about the fall of Rome than about the death of any other
political entity. Divers and contradictory theories are advanced to explain a complex historical phenomenon, and different
dates are assigned for its end. Thus, for some, Rome "fell"
in 476; for others, that year saw merely the climax of a process
which began long before. Similarly, 1968 marks the end of the
British Empire, but the manner of its going was clear long before.
The basic difficulty, of course, is twofold: to distinguish longrange causes from proximate causes and to attach precise dates to
the start of great and imprecise events. Any assessment of
Britain's imperial role involves consideration of both.
The British Empire began in the Tudor age when a brash and
self-confident nation gave expression to its aggressive patriotism
and youthful exuberance by colonizing Ireland and by sending seamen and merchants beyond the seas to punish the Spainard and capture
his gold. Englishmen organized joint-stock ventures for a variety
of purposes, and this led to the beginning of British enterprise on
the eastern seaboard of North America and in the sugar islands of
the West Indies. This was the "first" British Empire -- an empire
of settlement, of colonies of Englishmen overseas. A "second"
Empire followed, overlapping the first, founded on the ambitions of
Englishmen for increased trade in the eastern seas. The ideal of
this Empire was a chain of trading posts protected by naval bases,
and its overriding purpose was commercial profit undiminished by
the expense and responsibility of colonization. But its actual
development turned out differently. The British were unable to avoid
collisions with the French. They continued to regard the sugar island.
as important; and they maintained their connection with North
America in Canada. They also rediscovered and occupied Australia
and New Zealand and peopled them with immigrants from the British
Isles. In India they filled the political vacuum left by the collapse
of the Mogul Empire under whose aegis they had once conducted
their business. And, once committed, the state assumed the obligation of protecting these new possessions. In time, other factors
prompted further expansion: greed, humanitarianism and missionary
zeal, and the fear of foreign intervention combined in varying
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proportions to fill Englishmen with an ambition to mark in red a large
portion of the map of the world.
Three factors conditioned this expansion. First, it was
accomplished, in its initial phases, largely without the direct
intervention of the state. Second, with an increase of imperial responsibilities, the British people were forced to
recognize that they had acquired an empire, and they began to
develop an imperial philosophy in keeping with the prevailing
climate of opinion. Third, the new Empire, as it grew, was far
from homogeneous. On the one hand were the colonies of European settlement -- Canada, Australia, and New Zealand -- increasing-

ly demanding control of their own affairs; on the other was the
"dependent Empire," predominantly non-European, centered at first
in Asia but coming to include large tracts of Africa as well. From
these factors followed certain policies. In 1846, Parliament repealed the Corn Laws, thus registering the finality of Britain's shift
from an agricultural to an industrial economy. By this act,
Britain withdrew from its colonies the economic benefits of membership of the Empire, and because she insisted so strenously upon
her own freedom from imperial obligations she could not deny to the
colonies freedom from imperial control. By the end of the 1840's
she had made the crucial decisions by which the colonies of European
settlement completed the framework of self-government in domestic
affairs. These two events -- the repeal of the Corn Laws and the
concession of "responsible government" -- implied that in case of any
conflict between Britain's domestic and imperial interests the former
would prevail, and, as a corollary, that the colonies of European
settlement had full freedom to manage their own affairs. The great
problems which now faced Britain concerned the extension to the
"dependent" Empire of the privileges conceded to the colonies of
settlement and the guarantee of equal rights and opportunities to
all British subjects, regardless of race, creed, or country of
origin. In time, the growth of colonial nationalism prompted
significant changes both in the structure of the Empire and the
attitude of Englishmen towards their imperial responsibilities. The
Empire gradually disappeared to be replaced by the more loosely
knit Commonwealth. And Britain's attitude towards the Commonwealth
was conditioned more and more by a reassessment of its discrete
interests and requirements in terms of its position as a European
nation.
This is the background for examining the decline and fall of the
British Empire. Of course, it began to dwindle and change long before
1968 -- at least a century and a quarter, if the repeal of the Corn
Laws and the concession of responsible government is taken to mark
the decisive abdication of imperial responsibility. But the
announcement by the Labour government of its intention to withdraw

the British military presence east of Suez and to leave Hong Kong,
an infinitely vulnerable trading post, and its enactment of
legislation to bar the entry of British subjects from East
Africa, mark the final slamming of a great door and the
throwing away of the key.
On the surface at least, the "legacy" of Empire is scarcely
visible: a few solemn banks, the missionary outposts of Threadneedle
Street; whitewashed stone barracks; gaunt Government Houses;
innumerable statues of Queen Victoria, than whom no mortal, even
Caesar, has been so memorialised; deserted clubs and fly-specked
hunting prints. bare garrison churches which once shook to the
hymnal roar of church parades; policemen in non-military uniforms
and judges in wigs. And there is something more: the great armies
of unmarked dead, shovelled into the ground and forgotten who
died on forced marches or of a skirmish or stray bullet or an
epidemic fever or the endless attribution of unsuitable climates
resolutely ignored. But the great monuments are few: a decayed
Irish castle; the crazed magnificance of Lutyneus' Delhi; the
eighteenth century churches of North America; some decent houses
recalling England in the Indian sun; and the architecturally splendid
ruins of the penal settlement in Tasmania. The Roman Empire left
more physical evidence of its existence. But Britain's was a
strange empire, with its own built-in political obsolescence.
This brings us to another consideration. The British Empire
was haphazard in its beginning and its development, founded,
according to one of its architects, in "a fit of absence of mind."
It was created of greed and pride, and of a missionary zeal which
could be both political and religious. Its people were capable
of heroic self-sacrifice, and its rulers displayed a personal
honesty almost offensive in its puritan rectitude. It was
planned by no man or government, and it spread over the map like a
lichen, almost with a life of its own. It could be scraped back and
destroyed at any given point. It was at once hated and feared and
envied and admired. And it caught Britain largely unawares. In
the early nineteenth century many Englishmen found the idea of empire
repugnant. As late as 1877 there was solid opposition to the
proposal to make Victoria "Empress of India." But the idea of
empire, at first barely tolerated, came to be embraced out of the
bottomless self-confidence of Victorian England. The classic
statement of that idea came at mid-century, when Lord Palmerston
enunciated a sort of divine right of Englishmen to interfere.
England, he said in a five-hour speech, was the natural guardian
of liberty, and liberty was indivisible. She could not remain an
island of liberty in a sea of autocracy but must assert her ideas
and impose her peace upon the world. And the world must be made
safe for Englishmen everywhere.

As the British discovered, the possession of an empire placed
the imperial power, though enlightened, in an untenable position.
Imperialism is difficult to justify on moral grounds, and British
colonial authorities could not interfere with even the most
obnoxious local customs without being accused of intolerance or an
officious display of self-righteousness. Thus, British actions in
India such as the elimination of widow-burning, approved by many
Englishmen, were opposed in India. No British government could
legislate against "untouchability," though an independent India has
been able to do so. Nationalists in all colonies complained of
regulations which permitted local authorities to detain persons
without normal judicial process, yet on achieving independence the
new governments have sometimes resorted to similar devices. British
colonial administrators were more often right than wrong and
frequently better able to carry out constructive policies than
the local populace; but the latter resented paternalism and
demanded the right to do for themselves that which was being done
on their behalf by rulers of an alien culture.
British imperialism was an historical phenomenon which has now
ceased to exist. From a tumult of enterprise and exploitation
and high unfashionable ideals repeated endlessly, it left a permanent
legacy; ports, railroads, and'highways, and a respect for education
and an ideal of independent justice. Less tangibly, it bequeathed
a dissatisfaction upon which new and better societies might be built.
More specifically, it left the apparatus of an independent civil service, albeit in skeletal form. More positively, it created a grudging
respect that under appropriate circumstances flowered into the
affection of people who shared an important human experience. But
if the connection with the imperial past is maintained through
the sharing of similar institutions, ideas, and experiences, it also
maintains the existence of unresolved problems because the legacy
of empire is also one of terrible grievances and the nagging selfdoubts of peoples long in tutelage to remote masters. The imperial
legacy is compounded also of a deep hatred for those who robbed the
ruled not only of their riches but of their heritage, and devalued an
alien culture and tradition. Under these circumstances, imperialism
leaves a curdling suspicion, and among young men humiliated by
memories of bondage it leaves a sense of grievance capable under
appropriate circumstances of flowering into bitter hatred and the
acceptance of any ideology which expresses that hatred in;an
effective way.
Today the flags are down. Few in Britain mourn the passing of
empire. The exhilaration of the imperial experience is over and the
present is drab. Today, Englishmen calculate their interests in
national and European rather than.-imperial terms. The flags came down
because of humiliations like the fall of Singapore and because
British governments have had to recalculate priorities in terms of

immediate economic necessity. Their lowering was assisted by
violence, but more by the patent impossibility of resisting
national wills. Most of all, they came down because Britain taught
its subject peoples to be dissatisfied and handed oVer to them
as the one permanent legacy of empire the political and social
weapons which made its decline as inevitable as the ebbing of
the tide.
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